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A NEW LOOK AT THE ERGON ARGUMENT IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 
Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, Georgetown University, for SAGP 1988
It is commonly assumed that the ergon argument consists in an 
inference which starts from the powers specific or peculiar to man 
and arrives at a definition of the human good. This would commit 
Aristotle to some form of naturalism which is either fallacious or at 
least not available to us because we cannot share his views about 
human nature.
The purpose of the present paper is to show that this 
interpretation is unsatisfactory. Aristotle's argument is based on a 
general principle which may be reformulated as follows: "For any x, 
if x has an ergon y_, then x will be a good x, if and only if x 
produces good instances of y.rr
The prior identification of the human ergon is then required in 
order to know what to evaluate when passing judgement on whether a 
human being is a good human being or not. The specification of the 
ergon must be achieved in an evaluatively neutral way since the ergon 
by itself does not provide any standard. I argue that this is 
conveyed by the expression energeia kai praxeis meta logou. 
Specifically human are all actions, right or wrong, which may be so 
precisely because they are accompanied by a logos.
This in turn allows us to understand another troublesome 
expression Aristotle uses to refer to the characteristic activity of 
human beings: energeia kata logon e me aneu logou, "activity 
according to reason or not without reason." I argue that it is wrong 
to take the first disjunct as referring to the part of the soul which 
has reason in itself and the second one to the part of the soul which 
obeys reason (Irwin). The disjunction stands for positive and 
negative evaluation of human activity, respectively. To act well in 
the moral, practical and theoretical domain amounts to acting 
according to the logos, i.e. according to the corresponding virtues. 
Failure in the moral, practical and theoretical domain, on the other 
hand, is not totally irrational : the coward throws away his shield to 
preserve his life, a fool deliberates well towards a bad end, and a 
mistake in theoretical thought implies entertaining a logos which 
happens to be false.
No inference from the ergon to the good takes place. On the 
contrary, the normative weight in Aristotle's ethics is carried by 
his analyses of the virtues. They provide the standards to judge good 
and bad performances of the human ergon.
I finally argue that the conclusion of the ergon argument does 
not rest on metaphysical or psychological premises (although they are 
not inconsistent, of course, with the doctrine of potentiality and 
actuality, etc. in the Metaphysics nor with anything held in the De 
Anima). Accordingly, I fail to see here an attempt to "ground a 
universal answer to the question of how we should live in a theory of 
human nature."
A NEW LOOK AT THE ERGON ARGUMENT IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
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Georgetown University
Recent discussion of Aristotle's inference of the definition Of 
eudaiinonia has focused, as far as I can see, on three important 
problems: whether Aristotle is successful in showing that man has a 
function or not, whether the premises of the argument are dialectical 
as opposed to metaphysical/psychological (or perhaps even of a 
different sort), and whether the wording of the conclusion commits 
him to an inclusive or a dominant conception of the human good.l
At the outset of the present paper I would like to leave these 
issues unresolved in order to examine first how the argument actually 
works. Towards the end I shall be in a position to say a word or two 
about them.
I see two reasons to reopen the debate on this aspect of the 
ergon argument. On the one hand, there is a widely held way of 
understanding the argument which seems to commit Aristotle to sane 
form of fallacious naturalism. There has been sane opposition to 
this, but I think a more precise argumentation can be offered against 
it. On the other hand, one of the most authoritative English 
translations of the N.E. circulating today (that of T. Irwin) 2 seems 
to me to give a highly misleading rendering of the argument. Given 
the influence of this translation in the teaching of Aristotelian 
ethics at different levels, I think it is important to call attention 
to what may well be a more correct rendering of a crucial passage.
I
I would like to start by giving a few examples of the general 
view that I shall criticize. I take them from two works that are 
likely to fall into the hands of anyone studying the N.E. today.
In the second edition of W.F.R. Hardie's well known book on 
Aristotle* Ethical Theory we read that
"...starting from the conceptions of the powers which 
are specific or peculiar to men as members of the class 
of living beings, Aristotle arrives at a tentative 
definition of the human good (1097 a 33 - 1098 a 20). "3
Although the expressions "starting from" and "arriving at" are 
somewhat vague, there is a suggestion here that an argumentative step
2is taken from a psychological premise about human powers or dynameis 
to the ethical notion of the human good.
In the excellent anthology of Essays on Aristotle's Ethics 
edited by A. 0. Rorty something similar is held by K. Wilkes. She 
writes:
"A study of man's ergon, then, can tell us what it is 
to be a good man, once we have discovered just what 
activities are indeed characteristic of mankind."^
Since "what it is to be a good man" stands for an evaluative 
question, indeed the question which is answered by giving a 
definition of the human good or happiness, we here have once again 
the idea of some kind of inference fron the ergon of man to a basic 
ethical notion.
In the same collection of articles T. Nagel goes even further 
when he holds that
"The proper ergon of man, by which human excellence is 
measured, is that which makes him a man rather than 
anything e l s e . ( m y  emphasis, not Nagel's)
I am not sure I am being uncharitable in the interpretation of 
this quotation, but it does suggest to me that the ergon of man is 
expected to provide something like a measuring rod to determine the 
value of actions and/or persons. If these accord with the ergon, then 
they are good; if they accord perfectly, then they are excellent. It 
would not be difficult to rephrase this kind of relation between a 
measuring rod or standard and what is thereby measured in terms of 
premises and conclusion. The only doubt in my mind is whether the 
premise involving the ergon or characteristic activity of man is 
conceived by Nagel as descriptive or as evaluative.
Regardless of this last doubt, what seems to emerge fron these 
examples (and many more quotations along these lines could be easily 
produced) is a pattern of interpretation of the ergon argument which 
could be set out schematically as follows:
(Premise 1) "Human beings have a characteristic activity E," 
therefore,
(Conclusion) "The good for human beings is to exercise the
3characteristic activity E."
A more refined version of the pattern may well include a further 
premise which is both universal and evaluative and thus allows for a 
valid inference:
(Premise 2) "The good of any being (or perhaps any natural or living 
substance) consists in its exercising its characteristic activity or 
ergon."
II
I would now like to argue that the aforementioned way of 
presenting the argument is most probably wrong. I shall try to show 
that Aristotle does not arrive at a definition of happiness starting 
exclusively fron the powers specific to man, that a study of man's 
ergon by itself cannot tell us what it is to be a good man, that the 
proper ergon of man is not that by which human excellence is measured 
and that the good for humans does not consist in the unqualified 
exercise of the ergon.
In order to make these somewhat sweeping denials plausible, I 
shall analyse the long conditional sentence in the text which 
contains the inference. But before doing so, a few words must be said 
about the context in which it appears.
Aristotle has argued that a correct definition of eudaimonia must 
specify something which is both final, i.e. always chosen for its own 
sake but never for the sake of something else, and self-sufficient, 
i.e. such that it includes all basic goods.® He then proceeds to 
argue that a correct definition can be found if we first ascertain 
the function or ergon of man. The justification for this strategy is 
given by means of a general principle which runs as follows:
(Principle 1) "For all things that have a function [ergon ti] or 
activity [praxis], the good [tagathonj and the 'well' 
[to eu] is thought to*reside in the function."?
There seem to be two possible ways of understanding this 
principle: (a) one can take it to mean that it is good and "well" for 
things that have a function to exercise that function, in which case 
it would be equivalent to what I have called Premise 2, or (b) it can 
be taken to express that the good and "well" for things that have a 
function, i.e. the truth of a positive evaluative proposition about 
them, depends on the quality of the function.
4I am inclined to think that the second is the correct 
interpretation. Aristotle's inductive basis in the context includes 
"a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist." If we keep in mind that 
ergon also means "work" in the sense of the product of a techne or 
craft, it will become clear that what he means is that a positive 
judgement about a flute-player or a sculptor is the result of a 
positive evaluation of the actual musical performance or of the 
statue itself, respectively. A good lyre-player, Aristotle will say 
in the sequel, is one who plays the lyre well.®
Just to play the lyre, i.e. the mere activation of the ergon, 
cannot be good since if it is done poorly the musician turns out to 
be a bad musician and it cannot be good for a musician to be a bad 
musician.
The interpretation, then, that should be accepted may be 
formulated as follows :
(Principle la) "For any x, if x has an ergon then x will
be a good- x if and only if x produces good 
instances 6Έ y_."
Since for Aristotle the good for man is to be a good man, i.e. a 
high quality individual of the human species, the search for the 
human good requires that we first identify the characteristic 
activity of man. Otherwise we may not be able to pass the prior 
evaluative judgement upon which the judgement about human good ought 
to be founded. This does not mean that the identification of the 
ergon of man by itself will do the job. It only means that we will 
know where to look for a necessary and sufficient condition to decide 
when a human life is indeed a good human life. Much of what follows 
will tend to reinforce this.
The ergon or defining work of man is first described by Aristotle
as
praktike tis [sc. zoej tou logon echontos 
"an active life of that which has logos."9
Appealing to Politics 1325 b 14 ff., Stewart rightly indicates in 
his note ad loc. that this should not be taken to restrict the human 
ergon to action as opposed to contemplation. 10 It should rather be 
taken in its most general sense: the defining work of man, the one 
thing only humans can do, is to lead the life of the part of the soul
5which contains reason or speech. Typically human, then, is the 
activation of the capacity to think. Thought and reason, however, are 
present in a variety of aspects of our lives and it would be idle to 
try to pin Aristotle down to some specific form of thought at this 
stage of the game. Since in the argument proper there are three 
further characterizations of the human ergon, I shall have more to 
say about this below.
What is clear for the moment is that under the most plausible 
interpretation of Principle 1 the evaluation of the life of reason 
will allow xas to infer when a man is a good man.
This move, I would like to suggest, is exactly what the lengthy 
conditional whose consequent txoms out to be the definition of 
exodaimonia is sxipposed to accomplish.
Ill
Let us now take a closer look at the wording of the ergon 
argument. I quote it in the Revised Oxford Translation with some 
modifications and inserting the key Greek terms:
"Now if the function [ergon] of man is an activity of the 
soul [psyches energeia] in accordance with, or not without, 
rational principle [kata logon e me aneu logou], and if we 
say a so-and-so and a good so-and-so have a function which 
is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyre- 
player, and so without qxxalification in all cases, eminence 
in respect of excellence [kata ten areten] being added to 
the function (for it is a mark of the lyre-player to play 
the lyre, and of the good lyre-player to do so well) : if 
this is the case, [and we state that the function of man is 
a certain kind of life, and this an activity [energeia] and 
actions [praxeis] implying a rational principle [meta 
logou], and that it is a mark of the good man to perform 
these well and nobly, and if any action is well performed in 
accordance with the appropriate excellence [kata ten oikeian 
areten]: if this is the case,] human good turns out to be 
activity of soul in conformity with excellence [kat'areten], 
if there are more than one excellence, in conformity with 
the best and most complete [kata ten aristen kai 
teleiotaten]."11
I have allowed myself to modify the ROT at two places (lines 11- 
12 and 14) where it prints "the function of" without there really
6being an occurrence of the word ergon in the text. It is, of course, 
true that the genitives that appear could tacitly depend on ergon as 
supplied by the context, but it seems to me both more natural and 
better suited to the flow of the argument to assume that we here have 
the perfectly common construction of genitive + form of einai + 
infinitive and translate "it is a mark of (noun) to (infinitive)" or 
"it is peculiar to (noun) to (infinitive)".·^ What this implies is 
that in this context Aristotle avoids the Use of the expression "the 
ergon of the good man". Indeed, his argument relies heavily on the 
assumption that this expression does not have a straightforward 
referent.
How the argument is supposed to work is not at all clear. The 
best I can offer by way of analysis is the following list of 
ingredients :
(A) First we should note the inductive basis, i.e. the 
uncontroversial starting points, which seem to be represented by the 
references to the lyre-player. There are two of them:
(Αχ) "a lyre-player and a good lyre-player are said to have the 
same ergon."
(A2) "peculiar to a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and to the 
good lyre-player to do so well."
(B) The second set of ingredients are the generalizations based upon 
the previous instances:
(Βχ) "For any agent x who performs an ergon and any agent y_ who 
peforms that ergon well, the erga are generically identical."
This principle, which is supported by (Αχ), implies that the 
notion of ergon is a neutral, descriptive one. By itself the 
reference to the characteristic activity of something does not convey 
an evaluation of any kind. The good and bad performances are, of 
course, not strictly identical, otherwise we would not pass divergent 
judgements on them, but they are generically identical in that both 
are performances of the same activity, an activity, I would venture 
to say, which can be established in both cases by the same kind of 
quasi-empirical, or direct, inspection.
This is further conveyed by the second generalization:
(B2) "In order to distinguish between an unqualified performer 
and a good performer of an ergon, eminence in respect to excellence
7has to be added to the specification of the ergon."
This is supported by (A2) and states that there is no ergon 
peculiar to the good performer. His ergon is simply the ergon of any 
performer but with something added to it: its excellence. (B2) also 
seems to indicate that the evaluative judgement about the performance 
of an ergon is logically independent of the discovery and neutral 
description of the characteristic activity of a given class of 
objects or persons. Perhaps an apt way to illustrate this would be to 
say that someone who travels to a distant country, e.g. to India, can 
realize that in that country certain individuals play an instrument 
similar to the lyre. But to judge which of those musicians are good 
performers and which are not requires an altogether different kind of 
expertise based on adequate knowledge of the conventions governing 
musical performance within that culture. This judgement represents 
something over and above the mere realization that sane individuals 
produce generically the same sounds by playing the same instrument.
If the foregoing is correct, Aristotle would be saying that in 
order to identify a good F (or the goodness for Fs) two logically 
distinguishable steps must be taken: first, the ergon of Fs has to be 
ascertained in a non-evaluative manner, and then, an evaluative 
judgement as to what counts as a good performance of that erp;on has 
to be passed. Ihis latter judgement is equivalent to finding the 
arete or are tai corresponding specifically to the class of Fs. The 
ergon and the good are thus not strictly identical.
All of this is supposed to hold for particular human activities. 
The last ingredient then moves on to
(C) the application of the foregoing to the case of man as such.
Virtually all commentators I have consulted fail to realize that 
what Aristotle requires in the context, as a first step, is a 
neutral, purely descriptive specification of the ergon of man. This 
has led to a rather muddled account of the different formulae in the 
text in which the term lógos appears (kata logon e me aneu logou, 
meta logou). Another factor that has contributed to the general 
confusion. I believe, is the difficulty in using such terms as 
"reason", "rational" or "rationally" in English and other languages 
without conveying a positive evaluation. It is odd to say that 
someone conducted her actions with reason and to add that her 
actions were blameworthy.
A close look at the text will show that, apart from the 
specification of the ergon of man prior to the argument itself ("an 
active life of that which has the logos"), there are three 
expressions within the argument that are tosed to refer to it:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
8
psyches energeia kata logon e me aneu logou, 
psyches energeia kai praxeis meta logou, and 
psyches energeia.13
It seems clear that (iii) is a short-hand reference back to (i) 
and/or (ii). One should expect, of course, that these two will be 
equivalent, but how, exactly?
T. Irwin in his translation achieves a certain equivalence by 
rendering (ii) by "the soul's activity and actions that express 
reason" and (i) by "the soul's activity that expresses reason [as 
itself having reason] or requires reason [as obeying reason]" (his 
brackets).^
I find this unsat is factory on several grounds. First, to 
translate here and elsewhere kata with the accusative by "expressing" 
is rather misleading because the reader tends to loose sight of the 
normative implications of the Greek. One's actions may or may not 
express something, but this is quite different from whether they 
follow or fail to follow a rule or principle. An action may display a 
rule by not following it. Second, the two occurrences of logos in (i) 
are asigned by Irwin by means of the expressions in brackets to 
reason proper and to the appetitive part of the soul, respectively. 
This is unconvincing because the virtues of the appetitive part, i.e. 
the moral virtues, not only require reason, but are precisely 
instances of acting kata logon, in accordance with reason. This is 
what obeying reason amounts to in their case. 15 Third, the 
expressions kata logon and mata logou are vised elsewhere by Aristotle 
to mark a contrast between two different things. It is therefore 
dangerous to lump them together voider one single English expression.
The contrast I have in mind between kata and meta preceeding the 
term logos is found in N.E. VI. 13, a passage in which Aristotle 
criticises the Socratic conception of moral virtue. There, among 
other things, he says:
"...it is not merely the state in accordance with right 
reason [kata ton orthon logon], but the state that implies 
the presence of right reason [meta tou orthou logou], that 
is excellence."!®
In his commentary Grant relies heavily on this passage for his 
interpretation of 1.7. Indeed, he understands the transition from 
kata logon to meta logou in the passage from the first book as 
follows:0 -------
9MA machine might be said to move kata logon, 'in accordance 
with a law', but not meta logon, 'with a consciousness of a 
law. ' It is this consciousness of the law which, according 
to Hegel, distinguishes morality (Moralitaet) fron mere 
propriety (Sittlichkeit),"1?
As his words show. Grant is taking both expressions involving 
logos in an evaluatively positive sense. This also holds for his 
understanding of me aneu logon on which he comments in the following 
terms:
"In the euphues and the sophron, where desires flow 
naturally to what is good, reason would seem rather to be 
presupposed (hou ouk aneu) than directly to assert 
itself."18 “
As I have already suggested, this is unsatisfactory because if 
anything can be properly described as action kata logon is is surely 
sophrosyne. Here it is not so much a question of reason "asserting'' 
itself but rather of reason being in fact followed. To say that 
temperance is "not without reason" would be a very weak description 
of what counts as rational behaviour par excellence in the domain of 
the appetitive part of the soul.
I suspect that Grant has been mislead to identify the clearly 
evaluative expression neta tou orthou logou from VI. 13 with the (as I 
am trying to argue) neutral phrase meta logou of 1.7. If Grant were 
right in understanding the human ergon as actions not only in 
accordance with a law (his translation of logos), but also with a 
consciousness of a law, Aristotle would be committing a serious 
blunder by adding to that specification of the ergon, as he says we 
should, the eminenece in respect to excellence or virtue:
"and it is a mark of the good man [to perform] these [sc. 
the actions meta logou] well and nobly.
To consciously follow a law is already to act well and nobly. 
Therefore, the addition that the good man performs them well and 
nobly is a mistaken reduplication. I conclude, then, that the 
evaluative understanding of meta logou must be abandoned.
In order to reach a satisfactory alternative interpretation it 
would be useful to call to mind the passage in the Metaphysics in 
which Aristotle discusses certain dynameis or capacities which are 
only found "in things possessed of soul, and ip soul, i.e. in [the 
part] of the soul that has logos."20 These he calls dynameis meta 
logou and sets them apart from the alogoi dynameis, the capacities 
that do not have logos.
10
The difference between them consists in the following. A capacity 
without logos produces only one effect, e.g. the hot is only capable 
of heating. A capacity with logos is alike capable of contrary 
effects, e.g. the medical art can produce both disease and health.
The reason for this, Aristotle explains, is that "the logos 
manifests the thing itself and its privation’ll "for it is by 
denial and removal that it manifests the contrary."22
To show how this is supposed to work would require extensive 
textual analysis. The important consideration for the present 
purposes is that being meta logou is no guarantee for a good use of a 
technical skill or craft. Indeed, Aristotle is willing to generalize 
the point at the end of the chapter in which he has discussed the 
dynameis meta logou, the capacities with reason:
"It is obvious also that the potentiality [dynamis j of 
merely doing [poein] a thing or having it done to one 
[pathein] is implied in that of doing or having it done 
well, but the latter is not always implied in the former: 
for he who does a thing well must also do it, but he who 
does it merely need not also do it well."23
The conclusion I would venture to draw from this passage (which 
incidentally shows a clear awareness on the part of Aristotle of the 
fallacy of going from fact to value) is that we now have a clue to 
understand Aristotle’s reference to the ergon of man by means of the 
phrase "activity and actions meta logou". He does not have in mind 
activity and actions that express reason (Irwin) in the sense of 
following the logos, nor actions "indissolublement unies h. la regle" 
(Gauthier-Joliv) because seme of them may be in clear violation of a 
rule.
What Aristotle has in mind are simply actions, right or wrong, 
which may be so prescisely because they are accompanied by a logos or 
awareness of a propositional account of some sort which can be 
affirmed or denied by the agent. Needless to say, these are the 
actions in which only humans can engage. They constitute our 
characteristic activity.
If this settles the interpretation of formula (ii) we may now 
reap its fruits for the interpretation of (i). What we should expect 
is that meta logou in the context was meant simply to refer back to 
the disjunction kata logon e me aneu logou. If this is the case, then 
these should not refer to two different capacities of the soul, as 
Irwin's translation suggests, but rather to the good and the bad use 
of reason, respectively.
11
No one will dispute, I trust, that in the domain of the 
appetitive part of the soul action in conformity with reason 
corresponds to the exercise of the moral virtues, i.e. to the good 
use of reason within this domain. If doubts exist it should be 
sufficient to quote Aristotle's closing statements on sophrosyne or 
temperance in Book.Ill:
"...and if appetites are strong and violent they even expel 
the power of calculation [ ton logismon]. Hence they should 
be moderate and few, and should in no way oppose reason [the 
logos] - and this is what we call an obedient and chastened 
state - and as the child should live according to the 
direction of his tutor, so the appetitive element should 
live according to reason [kata ton logon]. Hence the 
appetitive element in a temperate man should harmonize with 
reason [the logos] ."24·
In the domain of reason itself (to logon echón)25 as opposed to 
that which obeys the logos, Aristotle seems to favor a different 
expression for positive evaluation. Just as in the domain of the 
moral virtues kata logon is often expanded into the more precise 
expression kata ton orthon logon,26 the intellectual virtues are 
defined by a qualified reference to logos. Craft or techne is said to 
be "a productive habit with true logos''27 and phronesis or prudence 
"a practical habit with true logos.1 *2° I conjecture that both in the 
case of a sound medical decision and of a right prudential one 
Aristotle would be willing to say that the agent acted in accordance 
with reason and thereby mean that a true technical or practical 
proposition accounts for the action.
To take me aneu logou in an évaluâtively negative sense, however, 
seems to be the greatest challenge which the present reconstruction 
has to face. Why didn't Aristotle use para logon if he wanted to 
express the opposite of action performed kata Tôgon? The correct 
reply is, I think, that this new expression conveys an altogether 
different idea. Something that is para ton logon is outside the 
demain of reason, it is something different and not just a wrong use 
of reason. In 1.13 this phrase is used to introduce the appetitive or 
desiring element of the soul, an element which is distinct from the 
one that has the logos in the strict sense.29 Moreover, actions that 
are para logon because the agent is totally out of his mind would 
hardly count as specifically human.
I conjecture that what Aristotle has in mind is roughly something 
of this nature: the coward, the man who throws away his shield to 
preserve his life, certainly does not act according to the logos^Q , 
but his actions are not completely devoid of reason. A certain 
explanation or rationalization of them is possible. The lyric poets 
Archilochus, Alcaeus and Anacreon have no qualms about confessing
12
the loss of their weapons to save themselves.31 By reference to their 
self-preservation their actions were by no means totally irrational.
Failure in the domain of the intellectual virtues is also not 
without reason. If one sets before himself a bad goal and deliberates 
correctly to attain it, Aristotle would not call that an instance of 
excellence in deliberation [eubloulia]. In order to apply this term 
he requires that something good be attained. And yet he would not 
deny that reason is at work in both cases:
"...the man who is deliberating, whether he does so well or 
ill, is searching for something and calculating 
[logizetaij."32
Again, a failure in prudence because pleasure or pain have 
"destroyed and perverted" one's judgement [hypolepsis] does not 
amount to a total elimination of reason. It simply means that one has 
foiled to grasp a true practical proposition and has therefore acted 
on a false one.33 Something similar can be argued for, the use of 
theoretical reason [ to epistemonikon] although in this case the 
failure to grasp the truth of a proposition cannot be attributed to 
our emotions nor to the experience of pleasure and pain. A mistake in 
a demonstrative science is not without logos because it still 
consists in entertaining a logos, albeit a false one.
IV
I have hitherto tried to show that in the ergon argument the 
Aristotelian expressions kata logon and me aneu logou correspond to 
the positive and the negative evaluation of the use of reason in the 
appetitive, the practical and the theoretical domain. The expression 
meta logou in turn covers both of them.
Thus the premise including a reference to the human function is 
not evaluative at all. It is purely descriptive. But this does not 
imply that an inference from fact to value has taken place. As we 
saw, Aristotle is perfectly aware that a fallacy would be involved if 
that were done. The evaluative premise that allows for a valid 
inference is the principle introduced at the beginning. Therefore, 
the argument itself is best set out as follows: 123
(1) "For any x, if x has an ergon y_, then x will be a good x, if and 
only if x produces good instances of £." (= Principle la)
(2) "The ergon of man is activity with reason."
Therefore,
(3) "A human being will be a good human being if and only if he
13
produces good instances of activity with reason."
If the foregoing diagnosis of the argument is correct, some 
interesting consequences seem to follow for the contemporary debate.
First, it should become clear that attempts to deny that man has 
an ergon or characteristic activity by producing (often amusing) 
lists of human activities are certainly misguided. A recent 
commentator writes:
"He [sc. Aristotle].. .would see that man makes love, buys 
and sells, plots revenge, collects bits of string, listens 
to Mozart (or soft Lydian airs), washes his socks, travels 
to Ionia (or, as it may be, Toronto), worships God, exploits 
his neighbour, practices virtue, lies, cheats, murders, and 
does metaphysics."^
Aristotle would, of course, see this but he surely would add that 
the criterion used to set up the list in the first place is that all 
of the items included are performed according to reason or at least 
not without reason. Otherwise they would not belong on the list. In 
other words, the human ergon is conceived by Aristotle in very 
general terms and therefore does not exclude any activity, however 
perverse or mistaken, as long as it involves reason.
Second, the clarification that follows the conclusion ("if there 
are more than one excellence, in conformity with the best and most 
complete") seems to point in the direction of the inclusive 
interpretation. If the ergon of man is taken at a high level of 
generality, then it is natural to expect that the set of good uses of 
reason, i.e. of virtues, will be quite broad. Indeed, it has to be 
the complete set by virtue of the self-sufficiency argument: the best 
human being will be the one who, ideally, of course, activates reason 
well in all domains of action with reason. If a man acts in 
accordance with the virtue of the contemplative faculty but fails to 
act virtuously in the moral domain, then he is not the best man. 
Better than him is the practitioner of both intellectual and moral 
virtues.
Third, I would very much hesitate to call the first premise a 
metaphysical principle. It is of course not inconsistent with 
Aristotle's doctrines of potentiality and actuality, but admission of 
its truth does not require reading the Metaphysics. It seems to be 
something like a common-sense principle for evaluation. Indeed, I 
would say that we normally conduct our evaluations in this way. We 
identify whatever is specific to the class to which an individual 
belongs (the class of architects, hotels, azaleas, bull-dogs,etc.) 
and then proceed to ask if this particular one represents those 
activities or characteristics well.
Such a rule, then, does not require initiation into the
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subtleties of metaphysics. But this does not make it an endoxon 
either because it is known to be true by any agent who exercises 
rational choice.
What about the second premise, is it not grounded on Aristotelian 
psychology? There is no doubt that in the quest for the human ergon 
Aristotle alludes to the three layers of life he has carefully sorted 
out in the De Anima. There is first the life of nutrition and growth, 
then the 1 ife of perception, and finally the life of the part of the 
soul that has logos. ^ 5 There is no reference in the passage of the 
N.E., however, to nous or noein, to the way noesis operates in 
relation to perception or phantasia, etc., i.e. to any of the 
distinctively Aristotelian positions in rational psychology. Indeed, 
the characterization of the human ergon in any of its four 
formulations is so vague that it hardly deserves to be called "a 
psychological doctrine" at all. No study of the De Anima is required 
to accept the view that humans and only humans are beings that can 
give a rational account of their actions, whether such an account be 
true or false, persuasive or unpersuasive, an acceptable 
justification or a mere rationalization.
This brings me to my fourth, and last, conclusion. Apart from an 
incidental use of pephyke in a rhetorical question,3° the ergon 
argument does not make an explicit appeal to human nature to support 
any normative conclusion. Its conclusion is evaluative, but it does 
not provide any normative criteria, i.e. it does not tell us exactly 
how we should conduct our lives in order to attain the human good. 
The normative weight in Aristotle's ethics is carried by the analyses 
of the virtues because they constitute good vises of reason. In his 
ethics something ought to be done not because it is natural, but 
rather because it is virtuous, i.e. good, to do it. I fail to see on 
what aspect of human nature one would have to focus in order to 
state, e.g. that one ought to be courageous and not play the coward, 
or that one ought to be practically wise and not a fool. If human 
nature is supposed to be a descriptive concept we may end in 
practical perplexity because cowardice and foolishness would 
certainly appear in any realistic portrait of the common features of 
human beings. But if the appeal to human nature is evaluative, then 
Aristotle's argument may well work the other way around: it is 
because courgage is good that we are entitled to view it as hexis 
kata physin, as the "natural" habit, in contrast with "unnatural" 
cowardice.
I have barely touched the surface of a topic that deserves 
careful treatment. I just hope that this new look at the ergon 
argument will make fellow scholars think twice before attributing to 
Aristotle a kind of naturalism which is not to be found at least in 
the passage where one would most expect to uncover it.
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